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V.W. 42/21.1.43

Copy No.

MORITZ and IBIS Reports

MORITZ reports began on 5/12/41, though they were not at first headed "MORITZ". Up to 6/1/43 there have been 502 MORITZ reports, known to us from Service 7/23. These represent a large fraction but certainly not the whole of those sent by SOFIA to VIENNA.

The majority of these reports have been received by VIENNA within 24-28 hours of their dispatch from (?) Egypt, and in most ascertainable cases within 48 hours of the happenings reported on. MORITZ reports are deemed reliable enough to be forwarded from BERLIN to the Abwehr Office with KESSELING and sometimes to the Naval Intelligence Officers of SOFIA and ATHENS. They are known to be not always accurate but KESSELING's Abwehr Officer complains if the supply dries up.

The Spanish Ambassador at NEAR Minister PRATT, who desired all Luftmeldekopf intelligence is apparently, to be kept quiet with MORITZ and IBIS reports. MAX reports for special reasons, are clearly not going to be given to him. So MORITZ is not thought to merit the highest degree of security.

MORITZ reports give military, naval and air force intelligence as well as some which is primarily political. About a quarter of the reports deal with air force matters, about a seventh with marine matters, the rest with military plus a few political matters. The air force and marine intelligence is as a rule more detailed than are the reports on troop movements, etc. Airfield equipment and convoy compositions are described with an appearance of precision. Troop-strengths are not estimated. MORITZ seldom identifies military, naval or air force units, save in so far as he occasionally mentions their nationalities. Battle-order particulars are not often given. The reports appear generally to issue from the visual observations of MORITZ or from hearsay and not from official documents or from questioning.

In one case MORITZ was to be instructed to keep the aerodrome of BORD EL ANAR, west of Alexandria, under continuous observation for at least 10 days, reporting on the number of aircraft and mentioning the time of observation. He was not instructed to ask any questions. (There is no sign that he fulfilled this assignment).

MORITZ reports deal with the following areas: EGYPT, LIBYA, TRIPOLITANIA, SYRIA, PALESTINE, CYPRUS, IRAK, IRAN, SUDAN, RED SEA, PERSIAN GULF. It is noteworthy that while about a third of his first hundred reports dealt with SYRIA and PALESTINE, only three or four of his last hundred do so. It is still more noteworthy that from about the middle of November MORITZ reports have dealt with LIBYA, CYPRUS, and TRIPOLITANIA, almost to the exclusion of

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anything else. MORITZ seems to be the successive origins of MORITZ reports over the last two months. MORITZ intelligence seems to hail from the area DENNA round 20/11.42, from area BENGHAZI during the last ten days of November and early December, from area BENGHAZI-AGEDABI during second and third weeks of December, from AGEILA and area AGEILA-SIRTE during the first week of January. What is general knowledge in Alexandria and Cairo no longer features largely, as it had done before, in MORITZ reports. The inference is that MORITZ has moved west with the Eighth Army, and that before this advance he had been at a base in Egypt, probably near ALEXANDRIA.

The promptitude of his reports proves that he must be in W/T contact with Sofia or with a permanent intermediate relaying-station working to SOFIA. The former is the more economical supposition. In either case, if he is with the Eighth Army, he must be either an authorised W/T operator or the controller of an authorised W/T station, doing Abwehr work 'on the side'. He must also be able to encipher and decipher messages.

He must then communicate with Sofia (or an intermediate relaying-station) with a cipher and W/T procedure which resemble his normal authorised cipher and procedure. He must transmit nearly every day. (Some possibly significant gaps will be mentioned later).

On 16.3.42 Sofia passed a MORITZ message to Vienna at 1512 GMT. The report mentioned the arrival of an Iraqi Air Force Mission at SUZZ early on that same day. As Sofia could hardly receive, decipher, appreciate, perhaps rewrite and re-encipher the report in less than an hour, MORITZ must have transmitted from Egypt before say 1400 hours on that day. Similarly on 19.3.42 MORITZ must have sent his report 1500 hours on that day. On 16.6 he must have transmitted before 1800 hours, on 27/8 before 1600 hours, on 16/9 before 1900 hours. This only proves that MORITZ sometimes transmits fairly early in the day. On an ordinary day MORITZ's transmission would take between 15 and 40 minutes. MORITZ's habit of giving detailed particulars about airfields, his BURG EL ARAB assignment and the fact that he works for I Luft suggest that he may have some connection with the R.A.F. or some Allied Air Force. And he should have been at BURG EL ARAB in the latter half of August. (Of course MORITZ may stand for a collection of persons, in which case the man at BURG EL ARAB need not now be in TRIPOLITANIA).

There has been nothing to indicate in what language MORITZ's messages are originally written. (He might be a Liaison Officer between the R.A.F. and an Allied Air Force. This might give him chances of visiting in person Syria, S. Iraq, etc. or of contacting officers who do so).

//\* - insert "and on the 17th, before 1600 hours: on 13.8 before 1700 hours

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MORITZ's External Sources

Until the middle of November, NO ITL would seem to have been in Egypt, probably based on Alexandria though with some freedom of movement. During this period when the bulk of the intelligence secured dealt with what could have been observed or overheard in Egypt, a considerable part consisted of reports, often 'hot', from SYRIA, PALESTINE, CYPRUS, IRAK, IRAN and other remote places. How did MORITZ secure this intelligence?

It is clear that the intelligence was not sent from say, BEIRUT, HAIFA, CYPRUS, BAGDAD, etc. direct to SOFIA, else it would not have dried up in the middle of November. Moreover, the tidings from, say, CYPRUS or BANDER SHAHPUR came at irregular intervals and often in splashes, which independent W/T services would have obviated. Somehow the intelligence came quickly to MORITZ, who sent it alongside of Egyptian and Libyan intelligence to SOFIA.

There is nothing to show what these outside sources were or how they communicated the news to MORITZ (save that the time available rules out anything but W/T or land-line).

It is possible that MORITZ has informants stationed in or visiting all or most of the localities from which these reports come. In this case they would, perhaps, communicate by sub-rosa use of an authorized transmitter. Alternatively, the intelligence may come to MORITZ's office as to an official clearing-house, some of which MORITZ steals for his private use. In this case MORITZ would have to be working for an intelligence organisation such as the Staff of one of the Services. The intelligence itself seems not to be of any one restricted type, but political information, plots, morale, disaffection, etc., bulk rather largely.

Note 1: There have been the following gaps in the series of MORITZ reports. Some of them may have been due to trouble in interception, or to holidays or preoccupation in SOFIA. 29/3/42 - 7/4/42; 20/4/42 - 25/4/42; 11/5/42 - 15/5/42; 20/5/42 - 2/6/42; 20/7/42 - 25/7/42; 2/10/42 - 6/10/42; 31/10/42 - 3/11/42; 12/11/42 - 16/11/42; 21/12/42 - 2/1/43. If a possible MORITZ is found, some of his spells of absence, if any, should coincide with some of these gaps. But as, normally, a message sent by MORITZ on Wednesday, say, is not passed on from Sofia to Vienna till Thursday or Friday, his dates of inaction would be one or two days anterior to these gap-dates.

Note 2: A MORITZ report sent to Vienna on 11/1/43 reads "Staff of 8th Army received report on 9/1 that preparations at BERRAT EL HSUB for offensive will be completed between 11 and 15 January. Reports are from Air Force and Southern Army Group". This is one of the few indications we have of MORITZ's sources.

**IBIS**

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Between 28/3/42 and 6/1/43 we have 143 IBIS reports on Service 7/23; the actual number sent was probably a good bit higher. They are usually fairly 'hot', though they tend to be 2 to 3 days old, while MAX and MORITZ reports tend to be 1 to 2 days old. Their scope extends over TURKEY (in early days) EGYPT, SYRIA, IRAN, IRAK, SUDAN, FRENCH EQUATORIAL AFRICA.

During the first two months, nearly all the reports dealt with TURKEY. Then, after nearly two months' interval, they started to deal with the British Middle East: IRAN, SUDAN, EGYPT, SYRIA, CYPRUS, etc. Since then only one or two have dealt with TURKEY.

The reports have been, on the whole, of the same pattern as MORITZ reports, though the proportion of intelligence is slightly lower, and they are sometimes, though not always, inferior in precision of detail.

IBIS reports are not deemed so valuable as MORITZ reports. They are fewer in number, and there have been several long intermissions (e.g. 16/5/42 - 9/7/42; 1/9/42 - 9/9/42; 23/7/42 - 30/9/42; 24/10/42 - 10/11/42; 10/11/42 - 4/12/42; 4/12/42 - 16/12/42). His transmissions would be shorter than MORITZ's; on 29/8/42 he must have transmitted before 1600 hours.

There is slight evidence that the IBIS transmitted (or operator) is not identical with MORITZ's; for on one or two occasions IBIS sends messages during a period when MORITZ has a few days' activity. But there could be other explanations for this.

It is reasonable to suppose that IBIS was in Turkey from March to May, and only began to work from Egypt in July. But MORITZ had been working from Egypt since December.

IBIS has not been infected by MORITZ's recent preoccupation with Cyrenaican and Tripolitanian intelligence.

There is nothing to show in what language IBIS reports are written, or whether there are any connections between IBIS and MORITZ (one or two reports are closely similar). The general similarity between MORITZ and IBIS reports in respect of style, content and areas dealt with suggests that the persons issuing them have similar facilities, contacts and functions.

The personnel and organization of the Luftmeldekopf, SCPIA, the character and sources of MAX, MORITZ, IBIS and ANKER reports and the routing of Luftmeldekopf intelligence to various operational staffs have been discussed in:

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- a) V.w. Report 24 of 24/4/42 'THE LUFTMELDEKOPF, SOFIA'.
- b) V.w. Report 25 of 4/5/42 'W/T COLLECTION AND DISPOSAL OF OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BY THE ABWEHR IN NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST'.
- c) V.w. Report 31 of 4/8/42 'THE SOURCES OF LUFTMELDEKOPF REPORTS.'
- d) V.w. Report 37 of 27/10/42 'ABWEHR NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICES IN NEAR AND MID EAST.'

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